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Two Faces of Financial
Innovation
~NNOVATION HAS ALWAYS been a hallmark
of the financial services industry. Indeed, the
history of finance can be organized as a chroni-
cle of innovations. We can trace this history
from the introduction of coinage in the Greek
state of Lydia in the 7th century B.C., through
the various ploys to circumvent the Christian
and Islamic bans on usury in the medieval era,
through the development of modern systems of
insurance in the isth and 19th centuries, on up
to more timely innovations such as foreign cur-
rency exchange warrants and interest-rate
swaps.’
Recent innovations have ranged from the
commonplace — the automatic teller machine
(ATM), for example — to the arcane — exchange-
traded options to buy futures contracts on
municipal bond index funds. Indeed, the range
of innovation, from new mechanical devices to
new contractual arrangements to new opera-
tional procedures, is so broad as to confound
concise definition of the term.2 Moreover, inno-
vations have recently arrived at a frenetic pace;
in the narrow field of exchange-traded futures,
for example, Silber (1981) lists 102 new con-
tracts introduced in the United States in the
1970s alone.
In response to the pace and diversity of finan-
cial innovation, economists have studied the eco-
nomics of innovation. Two largely distinct — but
not necessarily inconsistent — approaches to the
subject have developed over the last 20 years.
one approach, motivated by the imperfect suc-
cess rate for new securities, has focused on
improving financial products by applying the
principles of finance theory to the process of
contract design in securities markets.~The sec-
ond approach, motivated largely by central
bankers’ concerns about the effect of innova-
tions on monetary policy, has focused on the
reasons why financial innovation occurs. This
approach has examined the incentives for people
to develop new financial contracts or technolo-
gies.~Using two case studies, this paper illus-
1See Goldsmith (1987) for some descriptions of financial in-
stitutions and instruments throughout history.
2Schumpeter (1939) defines an innovation as a change in
the shape of the production function. He goes on to
categorize innovations as being either “process” or
“product?’ Process refers to innovations that permit an ex-
isting product or service to be provided more cheaply.
Product refers to innovations that introduce a product or
service that was previously unavailable. The ATM, for ex-
ample, is a mixture of both types. An ATM provides many
routine services, such as accepting deposits and disburs-
ing withdrawals, and usually does so more cheaply. At the
same time, an ATM can provide services that were previ-
ously unavailable, such as nighttime and weekend with-
drawals.
‘Some examples are Allen and Gale (1988), Chen and Ken-
singer (1990), Johnston and McConnell (1989), and Silber
(1981).
4Some examples are Goodhart (1986), Kane (1984), Podolski
(1986), Rasche (1988), and Simpson (1984).trates how financial innovations arise to meet a
perceived demand for new financial services.
The contrasting experience of the two cases
shows how market forces can spell failure for
product designs that do not attend to the princi-
ples of financial theory and success for those
that do.
In general, individuals do not innovate out of
a spirit of magnanimity. Indeed, we shall assume,
as we do with other economic behavior, that
financial innovations are created in anticipation
of material gain. Most theories of the incentives
to innovate can be understood in terms of a
cost-benefit analysis: new potential profits are
the incentives to innovate. These arise when a
change occurs that makes possible either a
reduction in costs, an increase in revenues, or
both. For simplicity, such changes are usually
treated as occurring exogenously to the finan-
cial services industry, even when this depiction
is not entirely accurate.
On the cost-reduction side of the cost-benefit in-
terpretation, exogenous technological change is
the force most often cited as producing the
potential cost reductions that can induce innova-
tion. As we shall see below, the transaction
costs and the costs of market illiquidity are two
factors that frequently affect the production
and success of financial innovations. Advances
in computing power, for example, have lowered
the cost of such accounting-intensive products
as brokered deposits and mutual funds. Other
products relying on rapid calculation and deci-
sion, such as portfolio insurance and index arbi-
trage transactions, have similarly been made
feasible by increases in computer speed. The
ATM, which reduces bank operating costs by ef-
ficiently executing much of a teller’s drudgery,
was made possible by gains in both computing
power and miniaturization.
Some of these innovations can also illustrate
the other side of the incentive to innovate — the
potential for increased revenues. Activities like
index arbitrage would be inconceivable without
some form of reliable, high-speed calculation;
computers can thus be seen either as reducing
the potential cost of the activity from infinity or
as increasing potential revenues above zero.
More commonly cited as forces that can
generate potential sources of new revenue are
government policy and inflation,’ The tax code,
in particular, offers numerous incentives. Tax-
payers innovate to exploit loopholes and avoid
assessments (for example, tax-free municipal
bond mutual funds), If taxpayers are successful
in using financial innovations to lower their tax
bills, government may seek to re-legislate to
close loopholes and expand the scope of taxa-
tion. Completing the cycle — in what Kane
(1977) has called the “regulatory dialectic” —
taxpayers find new incentives in the revised tax
code and innovate again, Broad-based macroeco-
nomic factors can also motivate innovation, For
example, inflation combined with deposit in-
terest rate ceilings in the late 1970s and early
1980s to produce new kinds of bank deposits —
super-NOW accounts and money-market mutual
funds — which function essentially as interest-
bearing checking accounts. More recently, the
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange experiment-
ed unsuccessfully with consumer price index
(CR) futures, which were to have, allowed inves-
tors to hedge against inflation.
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Creators of financial innovations are obviously
interested in whether their innovations will suc-
ceed in the marketplace. Success, of course, is
not automatic. For example, as Marton reports,
“some exchange officials privately admit that
they put out new futures products pretty much
the way a cook tests his spaghetti strands — by
flinging them against the wall to see if any of
them stick~0Because innovation is not costless,
however, it is important that innovators have a
more systematic approach to innovation than
primitive trial and error.
To examine the successfulness of specific in-
novations, we must first have some way of
measuring success. Because we have assumed
that people innovate in hopes of profit, a mea-
sure of success should either measure the inno-
5See, for example, Kane (1984) or Miller (1986).
6See Marton (1984), p. 239. Alchian (1977), pp. 30-32, dis-
cusses the role of trial and error in the process of innova-
tion, and he equates success with survival. He notes (p.
31) that “the available evidence Ithat the necessary condi-
tions are met under which trial and error converges to a
profit-maximizing equilibrium] seems overwhelmingly un-
favorable?’ For our purposes, defining success as survival
is not precise enough to be useful, since even failures will
survive at least briefly before their demise.vator’s profits directly or, at least, be correlated
with those profits. In many cases, a measure of
popularity can proxy for success. For example,
an exchange that introduces a new security
might measure success by dollar trading volume
in the new contract, Given a measure for suc-
cess, innovators can set about designing a pro-
duct to maximize that measure.
Some of the factors leading to a successful in-
novation are illustrated in the following exam-
ple- The economist Milton Friedman, anticipating
a devaluation of the British pound in the early
1970s, discovered he could not speculate on his
beliefs, because no bank would allow him to sell
the pound short, Hearing of his plight (and
presuming that his predicament was not
unique), Leo Melamed and the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange (CME) launched the International
Monetary Market (1MM). The 1MM trades, among
other things, foreign currency futures, which al-
low investors to speculate on devaluations (or
appreciations) of the pound. This innovation has
been successful because the CME found a trade
that investors wanted to make, but could not,
and it devised an instrument that allows them
to do so cheaply and reliably (an exchange-
traded foreign currency futures contract).’
A more general application of this recipe for
success must answer several questions- For ex-
ample, how is an innovator to know which as
yet non-existent security investors want to
trade? A full answer to this requires considera-
ble insight into investor demand. Famous
economists may offer suggestions, but this
process is not always reliable. Milton Friedman,
for example, also advocated the failed CPI fu-
tures contract.8
A secondary problem is knowing whether in-
vestors can already make a certain type of trade.
While the answer might seem readily obtainable,
the existence of substitutes is not always obvi-
ous. In the futures markets, for example, hedg-
ing a commodity position with a futures
contract on a close substitute (cross-hedging)
may be adequate or even superior to hedging
directly.°Identifying these possibilities and how
they might be used can be quite subtle. Such
subtleties can play a role in determining the
success or failure of a new financial product.
These issues play a prominent role in our first
case study.
Nonetheless, some rules of thumb do exist for
identifying likely successes in futures markets:
contracts based on commodities that are easily
standardized, have large price volatility, and
have enough suppliers and demanders to create
a liquid market.’°These rules are far from fool-
proof, however. Moreover, they do not general-
ize automatically to other types of innovations.
Indeed, codification of the elements of success-
ful innovation as a collection of rules is almost
certainly impossible; it is also beyond the scope
of this paper. Instead, we illustrate with two
case studies the more general ideas of the in-
centives to innovate and the application of
financial principles to real innovations.
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The first innovation we consider is a futures
contract on bagged Canadian silver coins, in-
troduced by the 1MM, This innovation was a
failure. After 13 months of meager trading, the
1MM discontinued the unpopular and unprofit-
able contract. Why did this contract fail? There
is an answer that is consistent with both our
theoretical rationales for successful financial in-
novation and with the facts: A good cross-hedge
existed in the much more liquid silver futures
market- There, hedgers could achieve similar
results at lower cost.
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On October 1, 1973, the 1MM opened trading
in a new futures contract on Canadian silver
coins. The purchaser of a contract promised to
pay a certain future amount in U- S. dollars
(USD) at a specific future maturity date; in ex-
change, the purchaser would receive future
delivery of five bags of Canadian silver coins
(dimes, quarters or half-dollars), with each bag
worth 1,000 Canadian dollars (CAD) at face
value- Different denominations could not be
‘See Miller (1986), p. 464. Similar speculation was possible
in the interbank market for forward foreign exchange. In-
dividual investors, like Friedman, are generally excluded
from this market, however.
Innovations like this, that expand the possibilities for ex-
change, are generally Pareto-improving. That is, they can
make everyone involved better off. See, for example, Flood
(1991).
~Auseful concept in this regard is “redundancy?’ If the
price of a good is always a fixed multiple of the price of
another good, so that the price changes for the two are al-
ways perfectly correlated, then one of the goods is said to
be redundant.
10See Black (1986), pp. 5-12.
°SeeFriedman (1984).6
mixed within a bag, and the coins were to have
been minted before 1967, with the exception
that a bag could contain up to 2 percent 1967
or 1968 coins containing at least 50 percent sil-
ver.”
The contract was presumably intended to af-
ford commercial banks holding vault inventories
of silver coinage the opportunity to hedge their
positions. In the mid-1960s, both the United
States and Canada had phased out the use of sil-
ver in their coinage. In an application of
Gresham’s Law — “Bad money drives out good”
— both banks and private investors hoarded sil-
ver coins for the bullion content, using instead
the new, non-silver coinage as a transactions
medium.12
The hoarded Canadian silver coins might be
valuable for two reasons. First, they were Cana-
dian currency and, therefore, could be ex-
changed for goods and services in Canada.
Second, they contained substantial amounts of
silver, a mineral with numerous industrial uses.13
Therefore, their USD value could fluctuate with
changes in the USD/CAD exchange rate or with
changes in the USD price of silver. Banks wish-
ing to protect themselves against such price
fluctuations could simply sell their stores of the
coins, or they could sell the new futures con-
tracts, which would lock in a future sale price
for their inventory. As we shall see, however,
indirect hedges were also available.
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We are interested in factors contributing to
the failure of the IMM’s futures contract on the
coins. One way to explain this failure would be
to find some other security that provides the
same risk allocation more cheaply. In other
words, we can explain failure by establishing
the existence of an efficient cross-hedge for the
futures contract. It turns out that, subject to
some caveats, we can demonstrate that the
coinage contract was indeed redundant.
In doing this, it would be helpful to under-
stand theoretically why the price of the cross-
hedging instrument should be correlated with
the price of the coinage futures contract. With
this in mind, we examine the dual role (as either
silver or currency) of the coins more closely.
At any time, the coins could be used for one
of two purposes: as a stock of raw silver for in-
dustrial purposes, or as a medium of exchange
for transaction purposes. The coins clearly
could not be used for both purposes simulta-
neously: industrial use would require melting the
coins; monetary use would require not melting
them. Instead, if the coins were removed from
bank vaults and put to use, we should expect
them to go to the more valuable of the two uses.
These relationships are presented in figure 1.
This surface is a plot of the value of coins as a
function of the USD/CAD exchange rate and the
USD value of silver. Given coordinates for the
USD value of silver and the USD value of Cana-
dian dollars, the height of the surface at that
point is the value of the bagged Canadian coins.
The graph formalizes the notion that the silver
coins are worth the larger of two values: their
value as silver or Canadian currency. The axes
are scaled to correspond to contract specifica-
tions in the futures markets. The units on the
CAD axis give the USD value of CAD 100,000,
the contract size for a foreign exchange futures
contract. Similarly, the silver axis gives the USD
value of 5,000 troy oz. of silver, the contract
size for a silver futures contract at the Chicago
115ee 1MM (1973a), p. 22. Because the payoffs described
here are all in U. 5. dollars, it may be helpful to imagine
that the hedging institution is a U. S. bank. Regardless,
the nationality of the parties involved should not affect in
any way the pricing relationships discussed below.
‘2The new coins consisted of a copper core clad in a
copper-nickel alloy; they contained no silver. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve (1970) ruled that vault in-
ventories of U. S. silver coins held by commercial banks for
their own account could still be counted as part of required
reserves, even though they were being hoarded and there-
fore would not circulate. Coins to which the bank did not
have “the full and unrestricted right” — for example, coins
held for safekeeping in the name of a speculating deposi-
tor — would not satisfy reserve requirements.
“1MM (1973a), p. 20, suggested that the numismatic value of
the coins might also be a factor. The possibility that
bagged coins might have significant numismatic value is
remote, however. Collectors grade coins according to quali-
ty (e. g., proof, uncirculated, very fine, etc.). With rare ex-
ceptions, coins of recent minting are priced above face
value, only if they are rated as proof or uncirculated. The
fact that the coins subject to the futures contract were
poured loose into bags implies that they could not be rated
proof or uncirculated. Indeed, the “sweating” of coins, i. e.,
shaking them loose in a bag to rub off silver shavings, is a
traditional means of debasing a currency. The ABA (1965),
p. 8, for example, claimed that it was “obvious that it will
be years and years before these coins have any value as
collectors’ items?’-7
Figure 1
Theoretical Relationship Between Spot Prices
Board of Trade (CBOT). The surface is a graph
of the function:
= max ~ 0.579%~,},
where ~ is the
coins at time t,
100,000, and \f,
oz. of silver.14
USU value of the five bags of
Vd, is the USD value of CAD
is the USD value of 5,000 troy
While this equation describes the relationships
among spot prices for the three commodities, it
does not address the price of the coinage fu-
tures contract directly. Two facts are relevant
to our investigation at this point: First, futures
contracts for both Canadian dollars and silver
were actively traded at the time; second, the
pt-ice of any futures contract must converge to
the corresponding commodity spot price on the
maturity date of the futures contract. The latter
condition holds because, at maturity, arbitrage
ensures that a contract for future delivery ef-
fectively becomes a contract for spot delivery.”
“The coefficients, 0.05 and 0.579, are simply the proportions
of CAD 100,000 and 5,000 troy oz. of silver, respectively,
present in five bags of coins. The contract requires that the
coins are worth CAD 5,000 at face value, or 5 percent of
CAD 100,000. The contract also specifies that “The coins
must bear a minting date of 1966 or earlier, except that an
individual bag may contain up to 2% 1967 or 1968 coins
containing at least 50% silver ... The gross weight of
each bag, including bag, seal, and tag shall not be less
than 50.75 pounds (avoirdupoisi for each (CAD] $1,000 face
amount;” emphasis in the original, 1MM (1973b), p. 2.
(Coins minted prior to 1967 were 80 percent silver by
weight.) Deducting 0.75 pounds for the weight of the bag,
and assuming that banks applied Gresham’s law, that is,
they chose their coins to minimize
the silver content of each bag within the constraints of the
contract, we find that each bag (CAD 1,000 face value)
contained 39.7 lbs., or 578.9 troy oz. of silver. Thus, five
bags contained 57.89 percent of 5,000 troy oz. of silver.
‘5For example, if the price of a maturing futures contract sig-
nificantly exceeded the spot commodity price, then an ar-
bitrageur could make unlimited, riskless profits by selling
futures, buying spot and delivering the commodity. There
is some margin for price discrepancies: this arbitrage is
only profitable if the price difference exceeds the costs of
transaction and delivery. Still, only one arbitrageur is need-
ed to enforce the arbitrage; the delivery and transaction
costs for the least-cost arbitrageur should be the only rele-
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Given these relationships, we can restate our
equation (approximately) in terms of the matur-
ing futures contracts:
max {o.osv~,o.s79TcT},
where ‘~Tis the USD value of the coinage fu-
tures at the maturity date, T, I1~1is the USD
value of CAD futures, and XT is the USD value
of the silver futures. Assuming that delivery
and transaction costs are negligible makes this
equation exact: ‘~T = max {0.O5VdT, 0379I’~T}.
This equation holds only at the maturity date of
the futures contracts, however. At maturity,
there is no uncertainty about which is larger,
0.05 VdT or °-~~9ET- Before maturity, ‘~T and 4~.
are uncertain.’~
As it turns out, this latter complication is
largely academic. In hindsight, over the life of
the coinage futures contracts, the coins were
never more valuable as currency than they were
as silver. Figure Z graphs daily observations
(scaled as in figure 1) of spot silver prices and
the USD/CAD spot exchange rate for October
1973 through June 1974. The line in the graph
corresponds to the crease in the surface of fig-
ure 1.17 The factthat all points fall to the right
of the line means that max(0.O5Vd(, 0-579V,1} was
always 0.579~’~~ (that is, that 0.579%~~ > O.O5V~).
More significantly, it appears that, even be-
fore the fact, investors considered an outcome
to the left of the line to be highly unlikely. If
the probability of such an outcome is negligible
(that is, if the probability is small that
0.05~ > 0.579~fj,then it is safe to use the ap-
proximation: max{0.OSVd,, 0379t~,} 0379\~~.
Moreover, if this approximation always holds in
the spot markets, it should also hold for futures
‘5We can still establish certain relationships between the
prices, however. For times t < T, the possibility that the
coins might be more valuable as currency than as silver
provides a price floor for the coinage futures in terms of
the silver futures: V~ > 0579V5t. Similarly, we have a price
floor for the coinage futures in terms of Canadian dollar fu-
tures: V,,, O.OSVd,. Finally, because holding both silver
and Canadian dollars at maturity must always be prefera-
ble to holding only the more valuable of the two, we can
readily establish a price ceiling: V,~s 0.S7etct + O.OSVdI.
“The crease in figure 1 is the set of points satisfying both
Vct = aosvdI and V~= 0579V
5~
.Thus, it is the line defined
by O.OSVdt == 0.579V~,or Vdt (0.579/0.05)V~. This is
the line graphed in figure 2.
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/Figure 3
Daily Futures Prices for Silverand Canadian Coins
Price of Canadian coinage futures
contracts; this implies we can use the approxi-
mation I~ O.579V,~
The upshot of this is that, as long as investors
could safely ignore the possibility that the coins
would be more valuable as currency, a silver
futures contract was a good cross-hedge for the
coins. In other words, the value of the coins
would be determined solely by their silver con-
tent, rather than their potential use as Canadian
currency — the value of the coins should move
in tandem with silver prices. Conversely, if all
the points were to lie on the left side of the line
in figure 2 instead of the right, the opposite
condition would hold: the CAD futures con-
tract would be the appropriate cross-hedge to
consider, and we could disregard the silver
contract.
The usefulness of silver futures as a cross-
hedge is confirmed in figures 3 and 4. Figure 3
plots daily price observations for silver futures
and Canadian coinage futures maturing in June
1974 and December 1974. The bold line through
the origin is the theoretical relationship under
redundancy: 1~= O.579V,~.
The other two lines are regression lines (lines
of best fit) for the two different maturitie&18
Given our regression results, we can be more
specific about the effectiveness of a cross-hedge.
The coefficient of determination, or R2 statistic,
from such a regression is a standard measure of
‘8These regressions show that the behavior of silver futures
prices and that of coinage futures prices are very similar,
implying that these two potential hedging instruments are
essentially indistinguishable from a pricing standpoint. An
alternative would have been to demonstrate their hedging
effectiveness directly, by regressing spot coin prices first
on coinage futures prices and then on silver futures prices.





Daily Prices for December 1974 Silver and Canadian
Coin Futures
Price of Canadian coinage futures
the effectiveness of a hedge, The ~2 statistic can
vary from 0.00 for a useless hedge to 1.00 for a
perfect hedge. For the regressions on the June
and December contracts, the fi2 statistics were
0.973 and 0.933, respectivelv.~~ The implication
is that silver futures moved closely together
with coinage futures, and thus could serve as
an excellent cross-hedge: Investors could have
achieved almost identical results with the silver
contract as with the coinage futures. This is
confirmed in figure 4, which shows the same
relationship plotted as time series of the two
prices. Silver and coinage futures prices moved
in near lockstep.20
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Having established the existence of a service-
able cross-hedge for the Canadian coinage fu-
tures contract, we now examine the contract
from the perspective of the innovator. From
this perspective, the contract is successful to
the extent that it profits the innovator. The in-
novator in this case was an organized futures
exchange, the 1MM, owned by the members of
the exchange. The membership of a futures ex-
change consists of its traders, who benefit from
an increase in trading volume through higher
19We can compare these numbers to the hedging effective-
ness of CAD futures. As expected, a regression of the
price of coinage futures on the price of CAD futures yields
lower H2 statistics, implying that silver futures were a better
cross-hedge. The ~2 was 0.568 for the June contracts and
0.715 for December.
The use of the p2 originated with Ederington (1979), pp.
163-64. The standard measure is based on regressions of
returns on returns, ratherthan prices on prices, as are
shown in the figure. Because the coinage futures had no
recorded price on most days (due to no trading), however,
it was not possible to construct a daily return series. An
imperfect alternative is to calculate returns from one price
observation to the next, producing a time series of returns
with irregular holding periods. The A2 statistics for these
regressions are 0.385 for the June contract and 0.419 for
the December contract.
In comparison, Johnston and McConnell (1989) report on
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) Col-
lateralized Depository Receipt (CDR) futures contracts. Dur-
ing the most successful years of the contract. 1980-82, the
hedging effectiveness (A2) of the futures contract for the
underlying GNMA securities over five-day holding periods
ranged from .85 to .94. During the contract’s leanest years,
1983-85, the A2 ranged from .54 to .62 percent, making it a
less effective hedge than a Treasury bond futures contract.
20Because of low volume in the coinage futures market,
there were many days with no bids or offers submitted
and, therefore, no posted settlement prices.
October 1,1973 to October 25,197411
turnover or through greater 1iquidity.~’For our
purposes, we can proxy for profits by measur-
ing trading volume in the contract.
Illiquidity can be costly to traders in two
ways. First, traders may be forced to search ac-
tively for counterparties with whom to trade;
searching consumes time and resources. Second,
traders who are delayed by the search process
face price risk: the price of their commodity
can change before they locate a counterparty.
In general, a trader would require some re-
muneration before bearing such a risk willingly.
One of the primary economic functions of an
organized exchange is to bring traders together
in the same place, to obviate such search costs.
There is a recursive catch in the economic logic
here, however: traders may not be attracted to
a market if it is not liquid, but a market may
not be liquid unless traders are attracted to it.
Trading volumes for the June and December
coinage contracts, however, were never large.
On most days, fewer than five contracts changed
hands. There were many days with no trades.
of 183 trading days for the June contract, there
were 66 days when only a bid quote or only an
ask was available; neither was available on 78
days. For the December contract, 92 of 310
trading days had only one side of the market
present, and on 181 days neither side was
available.22 Trading volume peaked at 45 con-
tracts on October 31, 1973; in comparison, for
the CBOT’s silver futures, several thousand con-
tracts changed hands on a good day in 1973.23
By October 1974, trading in the Canadian
coinage futures had dwindled to almost nothing.
The last recorded trade came on October 25,
1974, when a single December 1974 contract
changed hands.
In hindsight, we have a theoretical explana-
tion for the contract’s failure. Futures contracts
for Canadian silver coins should have been at-
21See Black (1986), pp. 19-21. There is no universally accept-
ed definition for the term “liquidity?’ It is usually associated
with an absence of search costs. See Demsetz (1968), Tin-
ic (1972) and Logue (1975) for further discussion.
22Figure 4 includes prices for the coinage contract for many
days on which trading volume was zero. The exchange
posted settlement prices on many days when either bids or
offers appeared but no trading occurred.
23A related measure of the coinage contract’s lack of
popularity is open interest (the sum of all traders’ net long
positions in the contract, also called committed contracts).
The same picture of a thin and illiquid market emerges.
Open interest in the June 1974 contract peaked in May
1974 at 56 committed contracts. For the December 1974
contract, the peak of 37 committed contracts was reached
tractive to owners of silver coins, who wanted
to hedge the value of their coins against price
fluctuations, and speculators, who were willing
to bet they could predict those price changes
more accurately than the rest of the market. A
comparison of prices reveals that existing silver
futures were a close substitute for the coinage
futures as a hedging/speculating tool. Moreover,
the long-established silver contract traded in a
much more liquid market. Thus, hedgers and
speculators had in the silver contract most of
the benefits of the coinage contract as a hedg-
ing instrument, without most of the drawbacks
associated with illiquidity. In this context, then,
the silver futures should be seen as uniformly
preferable to the coinage futures.
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We turn now to a successful innovation: mar-
ket index mutual funds. The size of the particu-
lar fund chosen as an example has grown steadily
since its introduction in 1976. Although an index
fund is little more than a repackaging of other
securities, with little decision-making discretion
left to the fund’s management, such funds can
succeed by r~ducingthe costs of transacting for
individual investors.
t.;lo.is(8 ~,tinn. 2) thio :1t8I.i.flti.~’
On August 31, 1976, the Vanguard Group in-
troduced the ‘500 Portfolio,” a stock market
mutual fund whose specific objective is to track
the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock market index
(S&P 500). In the language of the fund’s
prospectus, “the 500 Portfolio seeks to replicate
the aggregate price and yield performance of
the Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Stock
Price Index. ... The 500 Portfolio invests in all
500 stocks in the S&P 500 Index in approxi-
in October 1973. Again, in comparison, open interest for
the CBOT’s silver contract reached tens of thousands of
committed contracts during this time.mately the same proportions as they are
represented in the 1ndex.”~~
There are good reasons why we might expect
a market index mutual fund to be unattractive
to investors. First, it is inflexible. For example,
an investor in an index fund who wanted to
divest any stake in, say, petroleum stocks would
have to sell her entire stake in the fund. In con-
trast, an investor holding the same stocks directly
could sell petroleum stocks without affecting
her other positions. Second, a mutual fund intro-
duces a middle man: The fund must be compen-
sated for its investment management services,
which, for an index fund, are essentially paper-
shuffling. The allocation of assets in an index is
set by a predetermined rule, which an investor
could follow on his own.
On the other hand) there are also reasons
why investors might find an index fund attrac-
tive. First, despite the inflexibility of rule-based
indexes, some investors might be attracted to a
specific index, so that the inflexibility of that in-
dex would not be a binding constraint for those
investors. The standard capital asset pricing
model, for example, concludes that all investors
should hold a value-weighted portfolio of all
available assets to achieve the best risk-return
trade-off.25 Although the S&P 500 does not con-
tain all assets, it is well diversified, it is value-
weighted, and it is widely known. Perhaps for
this reason, the S&P 500 has become an indus-
try benchmark.26
Assuming there is a special interest in the
S&P 300 as an investment portfoho, we still
must explain the popularity of a mutual fund as
a preferred means of holding that portfolio.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1991) construct an elabo-
rate rationale for security baskets as a way for
uninformed traders to exploit the inflexibility of
a market index to diversify themselves against
losses to insider trading. A plausible, although
more prosaic, reason is that mutual funds might
be a way to spread the fixed costs of stock mar-
ket trades over many investors, thus lowering
the average cost faced by each investor. These
costs can be significant. Since stock prices
generally change many times in one day, the
number of transactions required to maintain a
theoretically exact index portfolio of 500 stocks
is potentially enormous. As long as there is a
non-zero fixed cost per trade, the sum of these
fixed costs of maintaining the index will be
proportionately large.
We saw in the first case that the prices of
Canadian coinage futures contracts were
tracked almost exactly by the prices of silver fu-
tures; the coinage futures were redundant. We
now perform a similar analysis on the index
fund and demonstrate that it too is redundant:
the value of the fund is closely tracked by the
value of the index. In this case, however, the
managers of the fund have actively pursued ex-
actly this correlation as their stated purpose.
Redundancy here helps explain the innovation’s
success.
Figures 5 and 6 are analogous to figures 3
and 4, respectively. Figure 5 plots daily price
observations for the Vanguard 500 Portfolio and
the S&P 500. We see that the fund price and
the index value move tightly together. Upon
closer examination, the prices seem to be con-
fined to a collection of line segments radiating
from the origin and rotating downward as one
moves further out. The line segments are peri-
odically bumped downward, as maintenance
fees, operating charges and dividend and capital
gains distributions tend to be concentrated in
24Vanguard Index Trust (1992), p. 9. For those unfamiliar with
index investments, it is important to note that a buy-and-
hold investment strategy is incompatible with indexing. The
composition of an index portfolio (i. e., the number of
shares of each stock) depends on the prices of all the
stocks in the index. Therefore, in contrast to a buy-and-
hold investment, the composition of a theoretically exact in-
dex portfolio changes every time the price of any one of its
component securities changes. A dynamic investment
strategy is required for an index portfolio.
Vanguard is only one of many companies to offer an
S&P 500 index mutual fund for investors. Its use as an ex-
ample should not be interpreted as a recommendation for
or against this or any other mutual fund. There are also
other ways of investing in the S&P 500 index, including in-
dex futures and index options.
2SSee, for example, Fama (1976), chapters 7 and 8.
26There are other commonly used benchmark indexes, for
example, the S&P 100, the Wilshire 5000 Index, or the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.Figure 5
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cumulative year-end adjustments 27 The line seg-
ments also tend to move successively outward
over time, because of the general upward trend
in stock prices over time. Even with these dis-
continuities, however, a regression of five-day-
holding-period mutual fund returns on S&P 500
returns yields an B2 statistic of 0.978; according
to the standard measure, the mutual fund is a
nearly perfect hedge for the S&P 500!~
Figure 6 shows the same relationship, but
with the soo Portfolio values and index values
plotted as time series. Over relatively long peri-
ods of time, the value of the index grows at a
slightly higher rate than the value of the mutual
fund. This long-run discrepancy reflects the fact
that the index is a theoretical portfolio — one
that assumes transaction costs are zero.29 The
mutual fund, on the other hand, charges each
shareholder a fixed quarterly account mainte-
nance fee, plus operating expense charges equal
to .2 percent of the value of the fund over the
course of each year. Over time, these fees ac-
cumulate and compound to produce a dis-
crepancy.
orrnance the eec .rUli
We turn now to the question of the innova-
tion’s success. For this, we need a measure. The
innovator in this case was the fund’s manager,
the Vanguard Group. We therefore define a
success as an innovation that profits them. For
an index fund, unlike many other forms of in-
termediation, the manager profits only through~
its fees. The fund receives periodic fees from its
shareholders, while incurring the costs of fund
management: accounting, buying and selling
stocks, receiving and disbursing payments, etc.
Data on management costs were unavailable,
however, so that profits could not be measured
directly.
Instead, we assume that the fund’s profits are
increasing with revenues over the entire range
considered here. Under this assumption, profits
increase with the size of the fund. We there-
fore use the size of the fund as our measure of
success.2°Figure 7 shows the size of the fund
both nominally and in constant (CPI-adjusted)
1983 dollars. Almost since its inception in 1976,
the value of the fund has grown exponentially.
In nominal terms, the fund currently contains
$4,346 billion, or $3176 billion in constant 1983
dollars.
One plausible explanation of the success of an
index mutual fund is transaction costs. Like
many expenses, the cost to an individual inves-
tor of a stock purchase can be divided into a
variable and a fixed portion: price per share
times number of shares plus a brokerage com-
mission. If large numbers of investors wish to
hold the index, and if the size of a brokerage
commission is fixed, or at least insensitive to the
quantity transacted, then the investors can pool
their transactions to reduce the total amount of
commissions paid. A mutual fund is one way to
achieve this pooling of investments.
Although the mutual fund falls short of the
index in the long run, the relevant comparison
is not with a theoretical entity, but with those
alternatives that are available on a practical ba-
sis. While everyone acknowledges the presence
of transaction costs, some might argue that these
costs are too small in modern financial markets
to make a difference. Gorton and Pennacchi, for
example, suggest that “investors can costlessly
replicate [these composite securities].””
27Because of differences in the way the index and the mutu-
al fund account for dividends and capital gains, tracking
the net asset value of the mutual fund tends to understate
its performance relative to the index. In particular, the in-
dex generally assumes that dividends, stock splits, etc., are
reinvested, adjusting the index accordingly, while the mutu-
al fund gives investors the option of collecting their divi-
dends and capital gains. Unfortunately, sufficient
information was not available to make accurate compensat-
ing adjustments to the net asset values of the fund.
28Performing the same analysis with daily returns, the A2
statistic is 0.859. The drop in significance is attributable to
the fact that returns for one-day holding periods are
smaller than for five-day holding periods, relative to noise
factors such as rounding errors.
29As noted in footnote 27, the mutual fund time series
presented here tends to understate its performance relative
to the index. If we were able to compensate for disburse-
ments, the compensated mutual fund price path would lie
above the net asset values shown here, but still below the
curve for the S&P 500. The average annual return calculat-
ed for the mutual fund on a compensated basis was 13.9
percent over the period 8/31/76 to 12/31/91, compared with
14.4 percent for the index. See Vanguard Index Trust
(1992), p. 16.
~°Afull discussion of the relationship between the size of the
fund and Vanguard’s profits, and therefore of Vanguard’s
incentives to innovate, would require consideration of is-
sues of returns to scale and market structure that are be-
yond the scope of this paper.
31Gorton and Pennacchi (1991), p. i. They go on to state (p. 2)
that “the popularity of such composite securities seems
puzzling since consumers, on their own, can apparently
accomplish the same resulting cash flow by holding a
diversified portfolio of the same securities in the same
proportions?’15
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transaction costs in the success of the mutual
fund, consider the performance of an index
portfolio managed directly by an individual in-
vestor trading through a brokerage house and
facing realistic brokerage commissions. To make
this example plausible, we consider pre-tax
returns on an S&P 500 portfolio for an investor
making a modest number of trades each day
and able to transact at standard brokerage com-
mission rates. In particular, we consider an ini-
tial net investment of $1 million in the S&P 500
index made on September 1, 1976. Assume that
our investor is able to track the index (approxi-
mately) by making 10 trades per day at an aver-
age cost of $30 per trade,32 Brokerage commis-
sions on this portfolio thus absorb $300 per
day.
Figure 8 compares the results for this portfo-
lio with those for the mutual fund over the life
over the course of almost 15 years, the value of
the index held directly has fallen to about
$860,000 in nominal terms, while the mutual
fund has posted a 119.2 percent gain. If we
were to adjust for inflation and dividends, the
poor performance of the direct portfolio would
be even more striking. The result is that inves-
tors who would otherwise have to trade at stan-
dard brokerage rates can hold the index more
cheaply as a mutual fund. Indeed, given such
transaction costs, it appears likely that an index
portfolio managed by an individual investor
would have negative ex ante returns. If this
were the cheapest means of doing so, no one
would want to hold an indexed portfolio.
— .~ ~2t~74
~..j .j. ,, ~
The foregoing has presented two case studies
of financial innovations. One innovation, Canadi-
22Brokerage commission schedules are complex and vary
considerably from one broker to another. Some of the fac-
tors that can affect the commission on a trade are volume
discounts, odd-lot trading premia, and negotiated commis-
sions for very active customers. The average $30 fee used
here is based on a commission rate of 1 percent of the to-
tal price of each transaction, an average share price of $30
per share, and trading in single round lots of 100 shares.
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To demonstrate the potential role of lower of the fund. The results are straightforward:Figure 8
An Index Portfolio Subject to Transaction Costs
succeeded for the same reason.
an silver coin futures, failed. The other, a mar-
ket index mutual fund, has succeeded. Together,
the two case studies represent an experiment of
sorts. We have examined two innovations with
a common feature: Both were redundant in the
technical sense that their price movements were
closely tracked by the price movements of other
securities. One might say that the first failed be-
cause it was redundant, while the latter has
This conclusion is more compelling if we state
it as the following more general proposition:
Given two securities with redundant prices (that
is, two that are perfect hedges for one another),
investors will be drawn to the one with the
lower transaction and liquidity costs. Ifthere is
no investor clientele for which a redundant
security is the cheaper to employ, then that
security will fail.
When stated in these terms, the conclusion
seems obvious. Nonetheless, this proposition is
not universally observed. It requires an explicit
acknowledgement of the fact that transaction
and liquidity costs can be significant factors in
the financial marketplace. This runs contrary to
the common assumption in financial economics
that capital markets are “perfect,” which im-
plies, among other things, that transaction costs
are zero. While such an assumption may be ap-
propriate in certain applications, a full under-
standing of the behavior of financial markets
and innovations requires an appreciation of
these various hindrances to exchange. Thus, to
the extent that financial frictions such as trans-
action and liquidity costs represent real resource
drains on an economy, successful financial inno-
vations should normally be regarded as welfare-
enhancing. By replacing cumbersome or ineffi-
cient modes of exchange, successful innovations
can make everyone involved better off.
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